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CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 
AUSTRALIAN REFUGEE PROTECTION IN THE WAKE OF THE TAMPA 
September 11, 2001, marked the beginning of a new and frightening era. In Australia, the 
events of that tragic day created a climate receptive to radically altering national refugee law. 
Hoping that other countries might accept asylum seekers who had arrived within its waters, 
Australia adopted a scheme to farm out asylum seekers to Pacific islands for the processing 
of their claims. This scheme was audaciously, indeed, somewhat contemptuously, named "the 
Pacific Solution." After setting out the relevant background, namely, the arrival in Australian 
waters of rescued asylum seekers on board the Norwegian freighter MV Tampa, this essay 
describes the legislative bases of the Pacific Solution and critiques the legislation in light of 
Australia's international obligations. 
I. FROM THE TAMPA TO THE NEW LEGISLATION 
On Sunday, August 26, 2001, the MV Tampa rescued 433 boat people from the Indian 
Ocean. The ship had been en route from Fremantle (in Australia) to Singapore, when Capt. 
Arne Rinnan diverted from his course in response to a call from the Australian Coast Watch. 
After asking the Australian authorities where he should take the rescued people and receiv- 
ing an unhelpful "don't know" for an answer, the captain headed for Indonesia. He was pres- 
sured into changing course for the Australian territory of Christmas Island by five of his pas- 
sengers, who had threatened to commit suicide. However, the Australian authorities ordered 
the ship to stop just outside Australian territorial waters off the coast of Christmas Island. 
Captain Rinnan alerted Australian officials to the scarcity of food and water on board. On 
Monday, August 27, the captain informed the authorities that four persons on board were un- 
conscious, one had a broken leg, and three were pregnant women. He requested that food 
and medical assistance be supplied. On Wednesday, August 29, the captain sent up a distress 
signal and then sailed into Australian territorial waters, stopping approximately four nauti- 
cal miles from Christmas Island. 
Responding to orders, forty-five Australian Special Armed Services troops boarded the Tampa 
and effectively took control of the ship. The Australian government introduced legislation 
into Parliament, the Border Protection Bill 2001, permitting the Tampa to be removed-as 
a matter of Australian law-from territorial waters. The bill was not specifically directed to 
the situation of the Tampa, but it would have been retrospective' and thus applicable to that 
ship. It provided for discretion to effect the removal of ships from Australian territorial wa- 
ters2 and the use of reasonable force to that end.3 Court proceedings concerning such ac- 
tions were not to be permitted,4 and applications for refugee status by any person on board 
the boatwould be invalid.5 The legislation was to have effect "in spite of any other law."6 The 
Senate, however, defeated the bill. In any event, the captain of the Tampa had indicated that 
he was unable to sail from Australian waters with all the asylum seekers aboard, as the ship 
was seaworthy for only fifty people. 
On August 30, the Norwegian ambassador to Australia was permitted to board the Tampa. 
He received a letter from the boat people pleading that they were refugees and effectively 
applying for asylum in Australia. The next day, August 31, two applications concerning the 
boat people were lodged in the federal court before Justice Anthony North. The appli- 
cants-the Victorian7 Council for Civil Liberties and solicitor Eric Vadarlis-sought habeas 
1 Border Protection Bill 2001, H.R., 39th parl., ?2. 
2 Id., ?4. 
3 Id. 
4 Id., ?7. 
5 Id., ?9. 
6 I&, ?10. 
7 Victoria is an Australian state (province). 
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corpus and an injunction against the removal of the ship.Justice North granted a temporary 
injunction and set the hearing for Monday, September 3. 
Meanwhile, the Australian authorities had been conducting discussions with various gov- 
ernments on the fate of the Tampa asylum seekers. Agreements with New Zealand and Nau- 
ru were announced on September 1, 2001. New Zealand had agreed to process 150 of the 
asylum seekers, particularly those in family groups, and to settle those determined to be 
refugees. Nauru had agreed to act as a processing center for asylum seekers, provided that 
Australia cover all costs and that any refugees be resettled in Australia or other countries. 
Arrangements were made to transfer the Tampa asylum seekers to the Australian troopship 
Manoora, which would take them to Papua New Guinea. From there, the asylum seekers 
would be flown to New Zealand and Nauru. 
The parties to the actions in the federal court agreed to the lifting of the court's injunc- 
tion on the basis that the government would return the asylum seekers if the applicants' case 
was successful. On September 11, Australian time, as the Manoora neared Papua New Guin- 
ea, Justice North held that the asylum seekers had been unlawfully detained as a matter of 
Australian law and ordered that they be returned to Australia.8 That night, the twin towers of 
the World Trade Center were destroyed by terrorists, killing thousands of innocent people. 
The government successfully appealedJustice North's decision.9 In the lead judgment, 
the usually progressive Justice Robert French held that, although the extensive legislative 
powers in the Migration Act of 1958 had not been invoked, the government retained exec- 
utive power to keep aliens from entering Australia'? that had not been abrogated by legisla- 
tion.11 Further, as the aliens had no legal right to enter Australia, no detention had occurred 
and any restraint on liberty that may have been imposed was not subject to habeas corpus.12 
ChiefJustice Michael Black dissented. In his view, the existence of a prerogative or executive 
power to expel aliens was dubious,13 while the enactment of extensive legislative powers had 
excluded any relevant executive powers.14 Moreover, the restriction of the asylum seekers' 
liberty had been so significant as to amount to detention; it was attributable to the Australian 
federal government; and it was illegal.'5 
One can only speculate about the different light in which the division between legislative 
and executive powers may have appeared to particular judges depending on whether the 
court sat before or after September 11. Clearly, with a federal election looming, the attitudes 
of the legislature changed markedly according to the perceived impact of the events of that 
day on the electorate. On September 26, the Australian Parliament passed no fewer than 
seven bills affecting refugees, including a new version of the Border Protection Bill. Among 
other things, the legislation: 
"- refined" the definition of refugee and the exclusion clauses (under which certain 
persons are barred from refugee status) ;16 
- introduced aprivative clause removing the possibility ofjudicial review in most immi- 
gration cases;17 
8 Victorian Council for Civil Liberties Inc. v. Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2001) 110 FCR 
452. Most of the facts for this introduction are taken from id., paras. 14-40. 
9 Ruddock v. Vadarlis (2001) 110 FCR 491 (Fed. Ct.) (three-judge panel). 
10 Id., para. 193 (French, J.). 
Id., para. 202. 
12 Id., paras. 212-15. 
13 Id., para. 29 (Black, C.J.). 
14 Id., paras. 60-64. 
15 Id., paras. 80-90. 
16 Migration Legislation Amendment Act (No. 6) 2001 (Austl.) (inserting ??91R, S into the Migration Act 1958 
(Austl.)). The Migration Act and other Australian statutes are available online at <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/ 
legis/cth/consol_act>. 17 
Migration Legislation Amendment (Judicial Review) Act 2001 (Austl.) (repealing and replacing ?474 of the 
Migration Act). 
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- validated the actions related to the Tampa and introduced new interdiction powers;- 
-excised certain territories from the "migration zone" (the area in which valid applica- 
tions for an Australian visa may be made) for the purposes of refugee law;19 
- prevented "offshore entry persons" (unauthorized entrants to the excised areas) 2 from 
applying for protection visas in Australia,21 and permitted them to be taken offshore 
for the processing of their claims to refugee status;22 and 
- created a new temporary visa category for offshore entry persons,23 which effectively 
prohibits family reunion. 
The only opposition came from the smaller parties (the Democrats and Greens)24 and one 
independent in the Senate. 
After the passage of the legislation, an application for special leave to appeal to the High 
Court on behalf of the asylum seekers rescued by the Tampa proved unsuccessful because 
the boat people were no longer detained within Australianjurisdiction and the case was there- 
fore moot.25 In any event, the case would have been confined to a fairly limited scope in its 
consideration of human rights and refugee questions, revolving around the question of 
liberty. As significant as that question clearly is, the legislation that constitutes the legal basis 
for the Pacific Solution raises much larger questions concerning refugee protection. 
II. THE NEW LEGISLATIVE SCHEME 
The Pacific Solution consists of three main pieces of legislation. The first is the Border 
Protection (Validation and Enforcement Powers) Act of 2001 (hereinafter referred to as the 
"Border Protection Act" or by the sections introduced into the Migration Act). The Border 
Protection Act validates the actions taken in relation to the Tampa2 and enacts new border 
protection powers, including the power of interdiction. Section 245F(8) of the Migration Act 
now provides that in certain cases (essentially involving suspicion of illegal immigration27), 
a ship or aircraft may be detained and brought "to a port, or to another place (including 
a place within the territorial sea or the contiguous zone in relation to Australia) ."28 In addi- 
tion, section 7A of the Migration Act now provides that " [t] he existence of statutory powers 
under this Act does not prevent the exercise of any executive power of the Commonwealth 
to protect Australia's borders, including, where necessary, by ejecting persons who have 
crossed those borders." 
18 Border Protection (Validation and Enforcement Powers) Act 2001, sched. 2, cl. 7 (Austl.) (inserting ?245F(8) 
into the Migration Act) & sched. 2, cl. 2 (inserting ?7A into the Migration Act) [hereinafter Border Protection Act]. 
19 Migration Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) Act 2001 (Austl.) [hereinafter Excision Act]. 
20 See the definitions in section 5 of the Migration Act, as amended by id. 
21 Migration Act ?46A (inserted by the Excision Act, supra note 19). Protection visas are the usual way that Aus- 
tralia meets its obligations under the Refugee Convention, infra note 45. 22 MigrationAct?198A (inserted by the MigrationAmendment (Excision from Migration Zone) (Consequential 
Provisions) Act 2001 (Austl.)). 
23 Visa subclass 447; see Migration Regulations 1994, cl. 447, as amended by Migration Amendment (Excision from 
Migration Zone) (Consequential Provisions) Act 2001. The Migration Regulations are available online at <http:// 
www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_reg/>. 
24 The major Australian political parties are the Liberal Party and the National Party, which generally form a 
coalition, and the Labor Party. 
25 See the transcript concerning the application for leave to appeal to the High Court in Vadarlis v. Minister for 
Immigration & Multicultural Affairs, No. M93/2001 (Nov. 27, 2001, High Ct.) (three-judge panel), available at 
<http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/hca/transcripts/2001/M93/3.html>. 
26 Given the full federal court's decision, the government would argue that there is nothing to validate. 
27 The three cases enumerated in section 245F(8) are (a) a craft in Australia reasonably suspected to be or to 
have been involved in a contravention of the Migration Act, in or outside Australia; (b) an Australian ship outside 
Australia where one may reasonably suspect that it is, has been, or will be involved in a contravention of the Act, 
either in or outside Australia; and (c) a foreign ship outside Australia where one may reasonably suspect that it 
is, has been, or will be involved in a contravention of the Act in Australia. 
28 Border Protection Act, supra note 18. 
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The second Act is the Migration Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) Act of 2001 
(hereinafter referred to as the "Excision Act" or by the sections introduced into the Migra- 
tion Act). The Excision Act removes particular territories, including Christmas, Cocos, and 
Ashmore and Cartier Islands, from the Australian "migration zone" to ensure that certain per- 
sons cannot make valid applications for visas. These territories are known as "offshore excised 
places."29 The legislation also creates a new category of unauthorized arrival-the "offshore 
entry person"-an unauthorized arrival who enters one of the excised offshore areas.30 Such 
a person is barred from applying for a protection visa,31 the grant of which is the usual way 
that Australia meets its obligations under the Refugee Convention. The minister for immi- 
gration may exercise noncompellable discretion to permit an offshore entry person to make a 
valid application,32 although precisely what kind of visa the person would be granted remains 
unclear. 
The third Act is the Migration Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) (Consequen- 
tial Provisions) Act of 2001 (hereinafter referred to as the "Consequential Provisions Act" 
or by the sections introduced into the Migration Act). The Consequential Provisions Act en- 
ables Australian officials either to detain offshore entry persons in Australia33 or to take them 
to a "declared" country.34 The minister may declare that a particular country 
(i) provides access, for persons seeking asylum, to effective procedures for assessing 
their need for protection; and 
(ii) provides protection for persons seeking asylum, pending determination of their 
refugee status; and 
(iii) provides protection to persons who are given refugee status, pending their volun- 
tary repatriation to their country of origin or resettlement in another country; and 
(iv) meets relevant human rights standards in providing that protection.35 
Nauru and Papua New Guinea are, or are being treated as, declared countries, and Aus- 
tralia has negotiated "agreements" for admission of the asylum seekers with those two coun- 
tries.36 So far, apart from New Zealand, other countries have not agreed to participate in the 
Pacific Solution, and Fiji has refused to do so.37 
The Consequential Provisions Act also creates two new visa categories. Visa subclass 451 
is for people intercepted on their way to Australia in transit countries like Indonesia.38 Visa 
subclass 447 is for "offshore entry persons."39 Both new visas are "offshore" visas, meaning 
that they are to be applied for from outside Australia.40 Three major preexisting offshore 
29 See the definitions in Migration Act ?5, supra note 20. 
30 Id. 
31 There are two types of onshore protection visas. Visa subclass 866, the permanent protection visa, is available 
to refugees arriving in Australia on a visa (for example, a student visa), while visa subclass 785, the temporary pro- 
tection visa, is now only available in principle to refugees arriving unlawfully (as a matter of Australian law) on the 
mainland. For the terms and conditions of these visas, see Migration Regulations, supra note 23, sched. 2, cls. 785,866. 
32 Migration Act ?46A(2). 
33 Id., ?189(3), (4). 
34 Id., ?198A(1). 
35 Id., ?198A(3) (a). 
36 See, for example, the "Statement of Principles" signed by the president of Nauru and Australia's minister for 
defense on September 10, 2001 (copy on file with author). The "agreement" appears to be a memorandum of un- 
derstanding, which Australia usually regards as nonbinding, and neither party seems to have registered it with the 
United Nations Secretary-General (not that either of these facts is determinative of the status of the agreement). 37 The Australian government has presented this refusal as a withdrawal of Australia's request: "Australia wel- 
comed the serious consideration the government of Fiji gave to its request, and in view of Fiji's current situation, 
decided to withdraw the request." Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Media Release, Fiji Visit, FA180 (Dec. 
12, 2001), at <http://www.dfat.gov.au/media/releases/foreign/2001>. 
38 Migration Regulations, supra note 23, sched. 2, cl. 451. 
39 See supra note 23. 
40 Migration Regulations, supra note 23, sched. 2, cls. 447.411, 451.411 (stipulating that "[t]he applicant must 
be outside Australia at the time of grant" of the visa). 
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visa categories, the refugee, global special humanitarian, and woman-at-risk visas, were all 
amended so as to preclude applications by people perceived to have given up protection 
possibilities en route to Australia. The relevant provisions in the Migration Regulations now 
stipulate as a criterion for these visas that the applicant may not, since leaving the country of 
origin, have resided continuously for seven days in a country where effective protection- 
either by the country or through the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR)-could have been sought and obtained.41 
The new classes of visas, unlike the three other amended offshore visa categories, are 
issued only for temporary periods. Visa subclass 451 is granted for five years. A permanent 
onshore protection visa (visa subclass 866) may be applied for after four and a half years.42 
Visa subclass 447 is granted for three years, and holders of this visa are precluded from ap- 
plying for a permanent protection visa.43 Both the 447 and 451 visas permit only one entry 
to Australia. Their temporary nature precludes family reunion for the duration of the visa 
in the case of the 451 visa category and so long as the visa holder remains in Australia in the 
case of the 447 visa category.44 
III. COMPATIBILITY WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Australia is party to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 
Protocol (hereinafter referred to together as the "Refugee Convention").45 Australia is also 
party to all the major human rights instruments, including the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights,46 the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or De- 
grading Treatment or Punishment47 ("Convention Against Torture"), and the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child.48 The legislation may result in violations of one or more of these 
treaties. The legislation may permit refoulement to a place of persecution or torture; it discrim- 
inates between asylum seekers; it permits detention of asylum seekers in Australia, and the 
agreements with declared countries contemplate detention in those countries as well; and 
family reunion is prevented, in some cases indefinitely. Since it is well accepted that inter- 
national law prohibits detention of asylum seekers while their refugee status is being deter- 
mined, unless factors relevant to the individual (for example, a high risk of absconding) re- 
quire detention,49 I will not dwell on that issue here. Rather, I will focus on interdiction, the 
development of the idea of "protection elsewhere," and the new visa regime. 
Interdiction Revisited 
The Australian legislation permits the interception of asylum seekers and denial of their 
access to Australian procedures for determining refugee status. Once an interception has 
been made, the Australian authorities have two options. One is to send the asylum seekers 
to countries participating in the Pacific Solution. New Zealand has participated to a limited 
extent and has accepted asylum seekers, generally those in family groups, for refugee status 
determination in the normal manner. Nauru and Papua New Guinea have also participated 
41 Id., sched. 2, cls. 200.212, 202.212, 204.213. 
42 Id., sched. 2, cl. 866.228A. 
43 It is now a criterion for a visa subclass 866 that "[t]he applicant has not held a Subclass 447 (Secondary Move- 
ment Offshore Entry (Temporary)) visa since last entering Australia." Id., sched. 2, cl. 866.214(1). 44 A person must be a citizen or permanent resident of Australia in order to sponsor a spouse or other family 
members for migration to Australia. 
45 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,July 28, 1951,189 UNTS 150, as amended by Protocol Relating 
to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 UST 6223, 606 UNTS 267 [hereinafter Refugee Convention]. 
6 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 UNTS 171. 
47 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, opened for 
signature Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 UNTS 85 [hereinafter Convention Against Torture]. 
48 Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 UNTS 3. 
49 See Communication No. 560/1993, Av. Australia, UN Doc. CCPR/C/59/D/560/1993 (1997), available at <http:// 
www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf>. 
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in the Pacific Solution, but only as facilities for determining refugee status. The key legal 
issues involved in this option are whether asylum seekers may choose to enter Australia if they 
wish or instead can be required to access protection elsewhere, and whether their treatment 
in countries like Papua New Guinea is consistent with human rights standards (see the next 
section below). 
The second, less obvious option for Australian authorities is to take boats of asylum seek- 
ers back to the high seas. This approach is permitted by the Border Protection Act, as there 
is no express linkage between the powers of interception contained in that Act50 and the pow- 
ers to remove offshore entry persons to "declared countries" contained in the Consequential 
Provisions Act.51 The latter powers would not necessarily apply to persons on an interdicted 
ship because they would not yet meet the definition of an offshore entry person. Forcing 
ships back out to sea may result in refoulement, which is prohibited by the Refugee Conven- 
tion and other human rights instruments.52 At the very least, the result might be "refugees 
in orbit"-that is, refugees traveling around, trying to secure entry to countries and being 
turned away.53 
The Australian government appears to think that interdiction is compatible with the Ref- 
ugee Convention. In support of this view, it could cite the precedent of the United States' 
interdiction of Haitian asylum seekers. However, although at various times the U.S. program 
did provide for some sort of hearings (albeit unsatisfactory ones) regarding the Haitians' 
claims, refugee advocates fear that many genuine refugees were rejected.54 In any event, the 
U.S. Supreme Court's 8-1 decision upholding the practice (Justice Harry Blackmun dissent- 
ed)-which rests on the supposed territorial scope of the Refugee Convention55-has been 
criticized.56 
The assumption underlying the Supreme Court's decision and Australia's adoption of the 
practice of interdiction-that extraterritorial interception (or, in the case of the Tampa, 
interception within the territorial sea) of asylum seekers is permissible-is generally not ac- 
cepted. Article 33 of the Refugee Convention expressly refers to refoulement"in any manner 
whatsoever." Chain refoulement by causing a person to return to another place from which 
refoulement occurs is prohibited.57 Rejection of asylum seekers at the frontier is also pro- 
hibited by this phrase and agreement as to the interpretation of the Convention on this 
point is reflected in numerous conclusions of the Executive Committee of the UNHCR.58 
50 See the text at and following supra note 26. 
51 See supra note 22. 
52 Refoulementis prohibited by Article 33 of the Refugee Convention, supra note 45; Article 3 of the Convention 
Against Torture, supra note 47; implicitly, Articles 6 and 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, supra note 46; and Article 22 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 48. 
53 See generally GORAN MELANDER, REFUGEES IN ORBIT (International University Exchange Fund, 1978). 
54 Harold Hongju Koh, America's Offshore Refugee Camps, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 139, 139-58 (1994); Carlos Ortiz 
Miranda, Haiti and the United States During the 1980s and 1990s: Refugees, Immigration, and Foreign Policy, 32 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 673, 693-94 (1995). 
55 Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 113 S.Ct. 2549,2563-66 (1993). The Court's decision is premised largely 
on the presumption against extraterritorial application of the relevant U.S. statute, 8 U.S.C. ?1253(h) (1) (2000), 
but the Convention itself was also considered. 
56 See, e.g., GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 143 (2d ed. 1996); Arthur C. Helton, 
The United States Government Program of Intercepting and Forcibly Returning Haitian Boat People to Haiti: Policy Implica- 
tions and Prospects, 10 N.Y.L. SCH.J. HUM. RTS. 325, 339-42 (1993). 
57 SeeJames Crawford & Patricia Hyndman, Three Heresies in the Application of the Refugee Convention, 1 INT'LJ. REF- 
UGEE L. 155, 171 (1989). 
58 UNHCR Executive Committee, Conclusion No. 85 (XLIX), International Protection, para. (q) (1998) [herein- 
after Conclusion No. 85]; Conclusion No. 82 (XLVIII), Safeguarding Asylum, para. (d) (iii) (1997); Conclusion 
No. 22 (XXXII), Protection of Asylum-Seekers in Situations of Large-Scale Influx, para. 2 (1981); Conclusion No. 
6 (XXVIII), Non-Refoulement, para. (c) (1977). The Executive Committee's conclusions are available online at 
<http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/>. These conclusions are part of the soft law used to interpret the 
Refugee Convention. Jerzy Sztucki, The Conclusions on the International Protection of Refugees Adopted by the Executive 
Committee of the UNHCR Programme, 1 INT'LJ. REFUGEE L. 285 (1989). This is because they are an indication of con- 
sensus on particular questions of refugee protection. Volker Turk, The Role of UNHCR in the Development of Inter- 
national Refugee Law, in REFUGEE RIGHTS AND REALITIES: EVOLVING INTERNATIONAL CONCEPTS AND REGIMES 153, 
165 (Frances Nicholson & Patrick Twomey eds., 1999). 
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Article 3(1) of the General Assembly's Declaration on Territorial Asylum59 also recognizes 
the principle of nonrejection at the frontier.60Just as other human rights obligations cannot 
be avoided by extraterritorial exercises of jurisdiction,61 so the obligation not to reject 
refugees and asylum seekers at the frontier cannot be avoided by the exercise of extraterri- 
torial jurisdiction by a state that luxuriates in the absence of land borders.62 
Ultimately, the legality of the interdiction program depends on the risks of refoulement. No 
asylum seeker has been returned directly to a place of persecution. On the other hand, Aus- 
tralia has not put in place satisfactory safeguards against chain refoulement. Several vessels 
have now been escorted back to Indonesian waters,63 and the Australian government clearly 
wants boats to return to Indonesia in the future. Indonesia is not a party to the Refugee Con- 
vention. In actuality, Indonesia grants temporary refuge, a practice that may support the cus- 
tomary international legal status of non-refoulement.64 However, refuge is granted on the basis 
that Western countries of immigration such as Canada, the United States, and Australia will 
take responsibility for resettling the refugees.65 It is thus questionable whether refuge in In- 
donesia constitutes protection elsewhere. 
Extending the Concept of "Protection Elsewhere" 
"Protection elsewhere" is relied on under the new Australian arrangements in two ways. 
First, Australia seeks to deny access to its procedures for determining refugee status on the 
basis that asylum seekers had or could have had access to protection in a country they had 
transited. Second, asylum seekers are taken to countries participating in the Pacific Solution, 
which were not transited by the asylum seekers and which, under the legislation, must be 
declared by the minister to meet certain minimum safeguards. In both cases, the Australian 
legislation copies, extends, or varies the idea of "protection elsewhere" developed in Europe 
and the United States and accepted, to some degree, by the UNHCR Executive Committee. 
The concept of "protection elsewhere" raises two issues. The first is whether asylum seek- 
ers may have the right to choose a country of asylum-a question upon which the Refugee 
Convention is largely silent. The second is whether refugees are "protected" in the place where 
they are sent. Protection encompasses prevention of refoulement, but it also extends to safe- 
guarding basic human rights. This interpretation has been accepted in key resolutions of the 
UNHCR Executive Committee discussed below, by somejurists,66 and in some state practice.67 
The two questions of protection and "choice" as to a particular country of asylum are often 
closely linked. Many asylum seekers are forced to move on because they do not receive ade- 
quate protection at their first port of call. Such asylum seekers often arrive in Australia 
59 GA Res. 2312 (XXII), UN GAOR, 22d Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 81, UN Doc. A/6716 (1967), available at <http:// 
www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/o_asylum.htm>. 
60 Assembly resolutions are evidence of states' views of the law. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against 
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Merits, 1986 ICJ REP. 14, para. 188 (June 27). 
61 See, for example, the decisions of the Human Rights Committee concerning interpretation of the words "ter- 
ritory andjurisdiction" in the cases against Uruguay involving the issue of passports and kidnapping by Uruguayan 
authorities in neighboring countries, discussed in MANFRED NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVILAND POLmTICAL RIGHTS: 
CCPR COMMENTARY 41-43 (1993). 
62 See, for example, the conclusion reached by Elihu Lauterpacht and Daniel Bethlehem, The Scope and Con- 
tent of the Principle of Non-Refoulement, para. 67, opinion prepared for the UNHCR global consultations (June 20, 
2001), at <http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home?page=events>. 
63 Philip Ruddock, Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, Media Release, Sus- 
pected Illegals Turned Back, MPS 193/01 (Dec. 21, 2001), at<http://www.minister.immi.gov.au/media_releases). 64 For discussion of the customary law status of non-refoulement, see GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 56, at 134-37. 
65 See, e.g., International Conference on Indo-Chinese Refugees, Declaration and Comprehensive Plan of Action, 
June 13-14, 1989, UN Doc. A/CONF.148/2, pt. E, excerpted in id. at 534. 6 
E.g.,Jens Vedsted-Hansen, Non-Admission Policies and the Right to Protection: Refugees'Choice Versus States'Exclu- 
sion? in REFUGEE RIGHTS AND REALITIES, supra note 58, at 269, 283. 67 Australia's own practice recognizes the relevance of general human rights in the declarations as to a particular 
country's safety under both sections 91N and 198A of the Migration Act. 
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because so many countries in the Asian region are not party to the Refugee Convention. 
What constitutes protection in countries participating in the Pacific Solution is also an issue 
since Nauru is not party to the Refugee Convention or, indeed, any major human rights 
instruments other than the Convention on the Rights of the Child, while Papua New Guinea 
is party to the Refugee Convention and Protocol but maintains significant reservations 
concerning fundamental rights such as the rights to work, public education, and freedom of 
movement.68 
A right to choose a country ofasylum?The concept of "protection elsewhere" is controversial, 
as some states argue against giving asylum seekers any choice as to the country of asylum, 
while refugee advocates sometimes argue in favor of giving them an unfettered choice. An 
accurate reading of the law may lie somewhere between these extremes.6 
On the one hand, the Refugee Convention does not contain a right to enter any particular 
country and its provisions are designed only for those who have nowhere else to go.70 More- 
over, Article 31 of the Convention, which prohibits the imposition of penalties on refugees 
for unlawful arrival, speaks of their "coming directly" from places of persecution. Restric- 
tions on the freedom of movement of such refugees may be imposed if necessary and "until 
their status in the country is regularized or they obtain admission into another country."71 States 
parties are to "allow such refugees a reasonable period and all the necessary facilities to ob- 
tain admission into another country."72 
On the other hand, the primary purpose of Article 31 is to prevent the imposition of 
penalties rather than to permit states to send refugees elsewhere.73 During the drafting, a 
proposal to amend Article 31 so that it would provide immunity from penalties only to refu- 
gees who could prove they were unable to find even temporary asylum in another country 
was dropped.74 As noted by Goodwin-Gill: 
The intention, reflected in the practice of some States, appears to be that other countries 
or territories passed through should also have constituted actual or potential threats to 
life or freedom, or that onward flight may have been dictated by the refusal of other 
countries to grant protection or asylum, or by the operation of exclusionary provisions, 
such as those on safe third country, safe country of origin or time limits. The criterion 
of "good cause" for illegal entry is clearly flexible enough to allow the elements of indi- 
vidual cases to be taken into account.75 
Indeed, many would support the view that asylum seekers have some choice concerning 
the country of asylum. In the Adimi case, Simon Brown, LJ., stated that 
some element of choice is indeed open to refugees as to where they may properly claim 
asylum. I conclude that any merely short-term stopover en route to [an] intended sanctuary 
cannot forfeit the protection of [Article 31], and that the main touchstones by which 
exclusion from protection should be judged are the length of stay in the intermediate 
68 Papua New Guinea has lodged reservations to Articles 17 (1), 21,22 (1), 26, 31, 32, and 34 of the Refugee Con- 
vention, supra note 45. 
69 For a detailed explanation as to the difficulty of drawing a definitive conclusion from the Refugee Convention 
itself, see Vedsted-Hansen, supra note 66. 
70 Professor Hathaway conceptualizes the Refugee Convention as offering surrogate protection to refugees only 
when national protection is not forthcoming. JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS 189 (1991). Sup- 
port for this idea may be drawn from Article 1A(2), second para.,Article lE, andArticle 1C(5) and (6) of the Refu- 
gee Convention, supra note 45. 
71 Refugee Convention, supra note 45, Art. 31 (emphasis supplied). 
72 Id. 
73 Rosemary Byrne & Andrew Shacknove, The Safe Country Notion in European Asylum Law, 9 HARV. HUM. RTS.J. 
185, 190 (1996). 
74 See Nazare Albuquerque Abell, The Compatibility of Readmission Agreements with the 1951 Convention Relating to 
the Status of Refugees, 11 INT'LJ. REFUGEE L. 60, 78 (1999); Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, Article 31 of the 1951 Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees: Non-penalization, Detention and Protection, para. 24, paper prepared for the 
UNHCR global consultations (Oct. 2001), at <http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home?page=events>. 
75 Goodwin-Gill, supra note 74, para. 28. 
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country, the reasons for delaying there (even a substantial delay in an unsafe third 
country would be reasonable were the time spent trying to acquire the means of trav- 
elling on), and whether or not the refugee [s] sought or found there protection dejure 
or de facto from the persecution they were fleeing.76 
An early conclusion of the UNHCR Executive Committee gives some support to the idea 
of a limited choice for asylum seekers and recognizes that they may have valid reasons for 
wishing to go to a particular country of asylum, such as the presence of family members. The 
committee's Conclusion No. 15 sets out criteria for identifying the state responsible for ex- 
amining an asylum request.77 The criteria to be taken into account include "the duration 
and nature of any sojourn of the asylum-seeker in other countries";78 the "intentions of the asy- 
lum-seeker as regards the country in which he wishes to request asylum";79 the fact that "asy- 
lum should not be refused solely on the ground that it could be sought from another State";80 
and a "connection or close links with another State" that, if it appears "fair and reasonable," may 
justify calling upon the asylum seeker to request asylum from that state in the first instance.81 
State practice is not fully congruent with Conclusion No. 15. The leading example is the 
Convention Determining the State Responsible for Examining Applications for Asylum 
Lodged in One of the Member States of the European Communities ("Dublin Convention") .82 
The Dublin Convention permits return to members of the European Union (EU)-all of 
which are party to the Refugee Convention and bound by the non-refoulment obligation in the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms- 
where entry to the Union has occurred through that state.83 The Convention, however, does 
acknowledge the importance of links between the asylum seeker and the country of refuge 
in cases involving family life or humanitarian considerations.84 The Dublin Convention also 
permits return to non-EU member states,85 which are sometimes not party to the Refugee Con- 
vention. European states have often adopted lists of "safe third countries" to which asylum 
seekers may be returned86-a practice also adopted by Australia in the Border Protection Leg- 
islation Amendment Act 199987 and by other states.88 
Implementing the Dublin Convention has been difficult, because of the need to prove 
that illegal entrants transited another country, among other things.89 In practice, the sponta- 
neous arrival of asylum seekers still determines where asylum applications are lodged, meaning 
76 Regina v. Uxbridge Magistrates Court, ex parte Adimi, [1999] 4 All E.R. 520, 527-28 (Q.B.) (Simon Brown, 
LJ.); see also id. at 537 (Newman, J.). 
77 UNHCR Executive Committee, Conclusion No. 15 (XXX), Refugees Without an Asylum Country (1979). 
78 Id., para. (h) (ii). 
79 Id., para. (h)(iii). 
80 Id., para. (h)(iv). 
81 Id. 
82 Convention Determining the State Responsible for Examining Applications for Asylum Lodged in One of the 
Member States of the European Communities,June 15,1990, 30 ILM 425 (1991) [hereinafter Dublin Convention]. 
83 Id., Arts. 5, 6, 7. For the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free- 
doms, Nov. 4, 1950, see 213 UNTS 221. Article 3 implicitly prohibits torture. See, e.g., Soering v. United Kingdom, 
161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989). 
84 Dublin Convention, supra note 82, Art. 9. In addition, Article 3(4) recognizes the ability of states parties to 
take responsibility outside the usual Dublin Convention principles. 85 Id., Art. 3(5). 
86 Sabine Weidlich, First Instance Asylum Proceedings in Europe: Do Bona Fide Refugees Find Protection? 14 GEO. 
IMMIGR. LJ. 643, 652 (2000). 
87 Migration Act ?91N. 
88Joanne van Selm, Access to Procedures: "Safe Third Countries," "Safe Countries of Origin," and "Time Limits," para. 
47, background paper for the third track of the UNHCR global consultations (June 2001), at <http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi- 
bin/texis/vtx/home?page=events>. 
89 European Council on Refugees and Exiles, Comments on the Proposal for a Council Regulation Establishing 
the Criteria and Mechanisms for Determining the Member State Responsible for Examining an Asylum Appli- 
cation Lodged in One of the Member States by a Third Country National 1-3 (Dec. 2001), available at <http:// 
www.ecre.org/eu_developments/stateresp.shtml>. 
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effectively that the asylum seeker has "chosen" the country of refuge. Since it may be equally, 
if not more, unfair to both states and asylum seekers to let responsibility rest on the country 
an asylum seeker first entered,just as it is unfair for countries with a strong economy to be the 
ultimate destination of asylum seekers, it may well be that states should accept the idea that 
asylum seekers have some choice. The European Council on Refugees and Exiles has urged 
the European Union to move away from the premises of the Dublin Convention and to 
accept that responsibility for determining refugee status rests with either the state in which 
an asylum seeker's family is present or the state in which an asylum application is lodged.90 
Notably, even the Kosovo evacuation program to third countries, including Australia-a 
situation of mass influx where a solidarity mechanism is required-was consensual,91 in con- 
trast to Australia's removal of asylum seekers to countries participating in the Pacific Solution. 
The new EU directive on temporary protection also requires asylum seekers to consent before 
being transferred to another state.92 Australia's policy, however, is more like the U.S. policy 
of removing Haitian and Cuban asylum seekers involuntarily to "offshore safe haven camps."93 
The number of asylum seekers arriving spontaneously in Australia is so small94 and the 
country so well placed to accept them because of its relative economic strength, its multicul- 
tural society, and the presence of many of the asylum seekers' families that talk about "bur- 
den sharing" on Australia's part is disingenuous. The government's rhetoric95 demonstrates 
the point made by Deborah Anker,Joan Fitzpatrick, and Andrew Shacknove96 that talk of bur- 
den sharing may be used by "sophisticated Northern governments" to abrogate their inter- 
national obligations while neglecting to provide financial assistance to other states.97 The 
Pacific Solution involves the payment of money to Pacific islands only for the short-term ob- 
ject of processing asylum seekers, and it has preyed on and distorted an already unequal re- 
lationship between Australia and Pacific states.98 
What constitutes "protection "?Regardless of whether asylum seekers have the right to choose 
a country of asylum, it is essential that any putative safe third country provide protection. The 
Australian legislation and practice is deficient on this score. This comes as no surprise in view 
of the government's apparent focus on deterrence and the allocation of blame for not hav- 
ing accessed protection in the past, rather than on whether protection is now achievable in 
a third country. 
Three conclusions of the UNHCR Executive Committee deal with protection elsewhere. 
Conclusion No. 15, which considers the selection of the state responsible for determining 
a claim to refugee status, has already been mentioned.99 The situation of asylum seekers who 
90 Id. at 3. 
91 UNHCR Skopje, Guidelines for the Humanitarian Evacuation Programme of Kosovar Refugees in the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (Apr. 11,1999), at <http://www.refugees.net/en/evacuations.html>. Australia's 
regulations speak of asylum seekers' acceptance of offers of temporary stay in Australia. Migration Regulations, 
supra note 23, reg. 2.07AC. 
92 Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20July 2001 on Minimum Standards for Giving Temporary Protection in 
the Event of a Mass Influx of Displaced Persons and on Measures Promoting a Balance of Efforts Between Member 
States in Receiving Such Persons and Bearing the Consequences Thereof, 2001 OJ. (L 212) 12, Art. 26(1). 
93 For discussion of this policy, see T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Safe Haven: Pragmatics and Prospects, 35 VA.J. INT'L 
L. 71 (1994); Koh, supra note 54. 
94 In the period betweenJuly 1, 2000, andJune 31,2001, there were 1508 unlawful air arrivals and 4141 unlawful 
arrivals by boat in Australia. Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, Fact Sheet 70, 
Border Control (Nov. 19, 2001), available at <http://www.immi.gov.au/facts/70border.htm>. In 2000 the total 
number of asylum applications in Australia was 19,400. UNHCR, Refugees by Numbers 2001, at 8, available at <http:// 
www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home?page=basics>. 
95 See particularly Philip Ruddock, Australian Statement to Parties to the Convention Related to the Status of Refu- 
gees, UNHCR Ministerial Council (Dec. 12, 2001), at <http://www.minister.immi.gov.au/transcripts/index.htm>. 
96 Deborah Anker, Joan Fitzpatrick, & Andrew Shacknove, Crisis and Cure: A Reply to Hathaway/Neve and Schuck, 
11 HARV. HUM. RTS.J. 295 (1998). 
97 Id. at 304. 
98 Greg Fry, The 'Pacific Solution '? in REFUGEES AND THE MYTH OF THE BORDERLESS WORLD 23, 26 (Australian Na- 
tional University, Dep't of Int'l Relations, 2002). 
99 See supra note 77. 
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have already been granted "protection" is dealt with in Conclusion No. 58.100 That conclu- 
sion states that the "irregular" movement of persons who have been protected from refoule- 
ment (but who have not necessarily been accorded a durable solution such as local integration) 
is undesirable. It provides that return of such asylum seekers to a safe third country is per- 
missible if the refugees or asylum seekers will continue to be protected from refoulement and 
"permitted to remain there and ... be treated in accordance with recognized basic human 
standards until a durable solution is found for them."1'' "Favourable consideration" is to be 
given to cases where a refugee or asylum seeker "mayjustifiably claim that he has reason to 
fear persecution or that his physical safety or freedom are endangered in a country where 
he previously found protection."02 Finally, Conclusion No. 85103 requires that any country to 
which asylum seekers are sent should observe their human rights, protect them from refoule- 
ment, and provide an opportunity for them to seek and enjoy asylum. 
In addition to observing the requirements of the committee's conclusions, the state of ar- 
rival should conclude an admission agreement with the putative safe country. In the absence 
of such an agreement, only the state of nationality has an obligation to admit a person to its 
territory. Decisions to send particular asylum seekers to a putative safe third country should 
also be communicated to that country to avoid misunderstandings about the reason for the 
asylum seekers' arrival.'04 Such misunderstandings can lead to refoulement. 
Australia's practice of returning people to Indonesia does not meet these requirements. 
Protection from refoulementis uncertain. Once asylum seekers have left Indonesia, they prob- 
ably do not have a legal right to reenter the country under Indonesian national law. Although 
it is strongly arguable that customary international law obliges Indonesia not to expel the 
asylum seekers, it is unsafe to rely on this obligation in the absence of an admission agree- 
ment, just as it would be unsafe to send an asylum seeker off to another country simply be- 
cause it is party to the Refugee Convention. Australia relies on Indonesia's participation in 
an arrangement with Australia whereby Indonesia intercepts asylum seekers on the way to Aus- 
tralia;'05 however, the two countries appear not to have made an express agreement concern- 
ing the readmission of asylum seekers once they have left. 
Whether temporary refuge in Indonesia qualifies as "protection" in a broader sense is also 
questionable. It is not the equivalent of refugee status with all its attendant rights, and one 
may doubt whether Indonesia can protect and ensure the fundamental human rights of asy- 
lum seekers, even given the assistance of the Australian government and the International Or- 
ganisation for Migration. Australia relies on UNHCR's presence in Indonesia as a guarantee 
of protection.l06 However, the mandate of UNHCR is limited. It can recognize refugees and 
provide humanitarian assistance--despite severe budgetary constraints-but it does not have 
the territorial base of a state. Thus, although its Statute speaks of securing "international 
protection,"107 UNHCR must work with states to achieve this goal.108 In practice, UNHCR's 
00 UNHCRExecutive Committee, Conclusion No. 58 (XL), Problem of Refugees andAsylum-Seekers Who Move 
in an Irregular Manner from a Country in Which They Had Already Found Protection (1989). 
101 Id., para. (f) (ii). 
102 Id., para. (g). 
103 See supra note 58. 
104 See Reinhard Marx, Non-Refoulement, Access to Procedures, and Responsibility for Determining Refugee Claims, 7 
INT'LJ. REFUGEE L. 383, 404 (1995), and his numbered conclusions 3 and 4 at 405. 
105 Principled Observance of Protection Obligations and Purposeful Action to Fight People Smuggling and Or- 
ganised Crime-Australia's Commitment 5-7 (2001) [hereinafter Principled Observance] (on file with author). 
For further information about the arrangement, see U.S. Committee for Refugees, PayingthePrice: Australia, Indonesia 
Join Forces to Stop "Irregular Migration"ofAsylum Seekers, REFUGEE REP., Aug./Sept. 2001, at <http://www.refugees.org/ 
world/themes/asylum.htm>. 
106 Principled Observance, supra note 105; see also supra note 41 and corresponding text (noting that amend- 
ments to the major offshore visa categories speak of "effective protection" by either the state or UNHCR). 
107 Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, GA Res. 428 (V), annex, paras. 
1, 8 (Dec. 14, 1950), excerpted in GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 56, at 384. 
108 This limitation is particularly apparent from the language used in paragraph 8 of the Statute, id. 
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powers concerning countries' obligations of protection are limited to suasion,109 and the 
agency certainly cannot compel a country to accept refugees as permanent residents. For 
Australia to push its "refugee problem" back on developing countries and a cash-strapped 
international organization unconscionably inverts its responsibilities. 
Australia also relies on "declared countries" to provide protection during the determina- 
tion of asylum seekers' status, which extends the notion of "safe third countries" adopted in 
Australia, Europe, and elsewhere"1? to countries that have simply agreed to determine refu- 
gee status as opposed to providing full refugee protection. The reliance on declared coun- 
tries shares at least one problem with the more usual practice of listing particular countries 
as safe-namely, failure to consider the position of the individual asylum seeker and the pos- 
sibility of refoulement that flows from this failure. The ministerial declaration contemplated 
in section 198A of the Migration Act refers to the general situation in the declared country, 
rather than the position of individual asylum seekers. Section 46A(2) of the Migration Act 
makes provision for ministerial discretion to lift the bar on valid visa applications in Australia 
if it would be in the public interest. However, the Act does not suggest any factors that the 
minister might take into account."l Presumably, it would serve the public interest for the min- 
ister to take into account considerations relating to individuals for the purposes of section 
46A(2), given that Australia would be in violation of international law if these factors were 
not considered. However, ministerial discretion is not the same as mandatory consideration 
of these issues and may therefore not suffice to meet Australia's international obligations. 
It is also unclear how "an opportunity to seek and enjoy asylum"'12 is offered by countries 
that merely act as processing centers. However, since Australia is supposed to remove all asy- 
lum seekers, including those determined to be refugees, from the "declared countries," it 
may be accepted that an opportunity to seek and enjoy asylum is granted indirectly. If no 
third country agrees to protect the refugees, it is suggested that Australia would be obliged 
to provide protection itself.'13 Certainly, detention of asylum seekers in declared countries 
does not conform to "accepted international standards.""14 In Nauru, for example, asylum 
seekers are held in conditions that amount to detention for the duration of their stay,115 which 
is a violation of human rights'16 and an example of refugee "warehousing"'17-treatment for 
which Australia should be viewed as jointly responsible at international law.118 
The New Visa Regime 
The new visas are best understood as an extension of the Australian government's long- 
term view that many onshore asylum seekers in Australia are "forum-shoppers." In 1999 tem- 
porary, as opposed to permanent, protection visas were introduced for onshore applicants 
for refugee status who had arrived without a visa.119 Also in 1999 the Migration Act was amended 
109 Of course, states parties to the Refugee Convention owe a specific duty of cooperation to UNHCR under 
Article 35 of the Convention. For nonparties, UNHCR's status as a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly gives 
it some status. 
110 See supra note 86 and corresponding text. 
~11 This omission may be contrasted with the amendments introduced by the Border Protection Legislation 
Amendment Act 1999. See Migration Act ?91 (Q) (1), (2). 
112 Conclusion No. 85, supra note 58; see supra text at note 103. 
113 It seems highly likely that Nauru would regard the "Statement of Principles," supra note 36, as legally binding 
and, moreover, that Australia might be estopped from failing to remove the asylum seekers. 
114 Conclusion No. 85, supra note 58. 
115 John P. Pace, Report of Mission to the Republic of Nauru, paras. 51-56 (Amnesty International, Nov. 16, 
2001) (on file with author). 
116 See A v. Australia, note 49 supra. 
ll7James C. Hathaway & R. Alexander Neve, MakingInternational Refugee Law RelevantAgain: A Proposalfor Collec- 
tivized and Solution-Oriented Protection, 10 HARV . HUM. RTS.J. 115, 130-31 (1997). 
118 See Draft Articles on State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Report of the International Law Com- 
mission on the Work of Its Fifty-third Session, UN GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, ch. IV.E.1, UN Doc. A/56/10 (2001). 
119 See supra note 31 concerning permanent and temporary protection visas. 
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by the Border Protection Legislation Amendment Act to ensure that persons with a right 
to enter and reside in another country could be sent there instead of being granted refugee 
status in Australia.'20 These amendments were entitled "amendments to prevent forum-shop- 
ping." The second-reading speech for the Consequential Provisions Act also adopts the rhet- 
oric that forum shopping should be prevented.l12 
The enactment of the Consequential Provisions Act on top of the introduction in 1999 of 
temporary visas for unlawful arrivals has created a many-layered hierarchy of refugees in 
Australia that has little bearing on protection needs. Successful onshore claimants for pro- 
tection who arrive in Australia on a visa, and successful offshore claimants who are not per- 
ceived to have given up prior protection opportunities, are given permanent protection.122 
Successful onshore claimants who arrive on the mainland unlawfully are given three-year tem- 
porary protection visas in the first instance,'23 though they may eventually apply for a perma- 
nent protection visa. Asylum seekers will now find it rather difficult to access this kind of visa, 
since many of them will arrive in the excised offshore areas. Successful offshore claimants 
intercepted while attempting to journey to Australia are given a five-year temporary entry 
permitin the first instance.'24 Successful "offshore entry persons"-those onshore claimants 
who arrive in one of the excised territories of Christmas, Cocos, or Ashmore and Cartier Islands, 
rather than the mainland-are granted rolling three-year temporary visas after effectively 
(barring the exercise of the minister's discretion) being treated as offshore claimants. The last 
three kinds of visa do not carry reentry rights and so long as the person's status is temporary- 
which is indefinitely in the case of offshore entry persons-family reunion is prevented.125 
As argued previously, attempts to preclude any choice as to the place of asylum are mis- 
guided for both principled and pragmatic reasons. The new visa regime grants Australian "pro- 
tection" to a degree, but it also serves to punish people who are perceived as having given up 
protection options elsewhere, without much consideration as to whether those options were 
adequate or are currently available. Thus, it may be challenged on the basis that it consti- 
tutes invidious discrimination and, effectively, a form of punishment for illegal entry into Aus- 
tralia. The new visa regime may also violate or put at risk other substantive rights, among them 
protection against refoulement and the right to family unity. 
Punishment and invidious discrimination. Article 31 of the Refugee Convention forbids the 
application of penalties to refugees who have entered a state unlawfully. Three questions arise 
in relation to the conformity of the new visas for offshore entry persons with Article 31. First, 
one has to consider the impact of the treatment of offshore entry persons as offshore appli- 
cants for refugee status. Such persons would normally fall outside the scope of a state's obli- 
gations under the Refugee Convention. Arguably, the effort to avoid the application of Arti- 
cle 31 of the Convention through the treatment of offshore entry persons as offshore claim- 
ants is a bad faith interpretation of Australia's legal obligations,126 since, as argued previously, 
it is difficult to see how Australia can avoid ultimate responsibility for the refugees under the 
Refugee Convention.127 
120 Migration Act ??36(3)-(6), 91N. 
121 
"The refugees convention does not confer a right on any of these people to choose their country of asylum. 
... [T] he bill amends the migration regulations to implement a visa regime aimed at deterring further movement 
from, or the bypassing of, other safe countries." Philip Ruddock, 39 CTH. PARL. DEB., H.R. (Hansard) (Sept. 18, 
2001) 30,871, 30,872. 
122 The three major offshore visas for refugees-the refugee visa subclass 200, the global special humanitarian 
visa subclass 202, and the woman-at-risk visa subclass 204-are all permanent visas. Migration Regulations, supra 
note 23, sched. 2, cls. 200.511, 202.511, 204.511. 
123 Id., cl. 785. 
124 Id., cl. 451. 
125 See supra note 44. 
126 As stated in Articles 26 and 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 
1969, 1155 UNTS 331 (a codification of customary international law), treaties are to be interpreted and imple- 
mented in good faith by the parties. 
127 See text supra at notes 112-13. 
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The second question relates to the meaning of the term "penalty." Clearly, this word encom- 
passes the imposition of criminal sanctions for unlawful entry. However, it may also prohibit 
all forms of discrimination between lawful and unlawful arrivals. As stated in a decision by the 
English Social Security Commissioner, any other construction "puts form above substance."'28 
The third question is whether the imposition of a lower form of protection for "asylum-shop- 
pers" is permissible. Article 31 speaks of refugees who come "directly from a territory where 
their life or freedom was threatened," suggesting that it may be permissible to discriminate ac- 
cording to the route taken to reach Australia. However, the Australian legislation does not per- 
mit even those "offshore entry persons" who have come directly from their country of origin 
to access the usual procedures for determining refugee status unless the minister lifts the bar 
on valid applications. Nor are refugees given the opportunity to explain why they were unable 
to seek protection in the countries they transited, unless the minister takes such an explanation 
into account in the exercise of his discretion to permit a visa application by an offshore entry 
person129-though Article 31 is clearly intended to allow unlawful entrants that opportunity.'30 
Even if Article 31 of the Refugee Convention is strictly interpreted to refer only to crim- 
inal punishments, rather than discrimination, or to penalties for unlawful entry rather than 
"asylum-shopping" in conjunction with illegal entry, other prohibitions on discrimination 
may come into play. Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, for 
example, applies where national laws adopt a distinction that is neither reasonable nor ob- 
jective.131 Generally, aliens do not have a right to enter a particular country. However, refugees 
may prove an exception in practice because of the need to give effect to the obligation of non- 
refoulementand other human rights obligations.132 Thus, if protection is given to refugees, but its 
level or type varies on a basis that is not objective and reasonable, Article 26 may arguably 
have been violated. All refugees require protection, above all, but not exclusively, protection 
from refoulement. Any discrimination between refugees on the basis of their mode of arrival 
(for example, its unlawfulness) may be considered invidious discrimination, as may discrim- 
ination according to route, if the refugees' valid reasons for taking that route are not taken 
into account. Furthermore, while the new Australian legislation may be intended to target 
refugees who have transited other countries en route to Australia and could have accessed 
protection there, visa subclass 447 for offshore entry persons is actually premised on the point 
of arrival in Australia. This is a nonsensical basis for providing different levels of protection. 
Non-refoulement and reentry rights. Failure to guarantee the reentry of refugees to 
Australia risks refoulement. Whether asylum seekers could have accessed protection in a 
country like Indonesia at one time is beside the point. What matters now is that these 
refugees may not be able to reenter Indonesia or any other country than the persecutory 
country of origin. Convention refugees must be permitted to reenter under Article 28 of the 
Convention and paragraph 13 of the schedule to the Convention. Moreover, refugees-like 
all human beings-have the right to leave any country,133 and this right is rendered 
ineffective for refugees at risk of refoulement if they have no corresponding right of reentry. 
The right to family unity. A third major human rights obligation thwarted by the new visa re- 
gime is the duty to respect family unity. Though not enumerated as a hard legal obligation 
128 Decision of the Social Security Commissioner, Case No. CIS 4439/98, para. 16 (Nov. 25, 1999), at <http:// 
www.courtservice.gov.uk/tribunals/tribs_home.htm>. 
129 The return of a Chinese woman to face a compulsory abortion in the eighth month of her pregnancy demon- 
strates that noncompellable discretion does not always fulfill Australia's human rights obligations. See SENATE 
LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL COMMITTEE [Austl. ], A SANCTUARY UNDER REVIEW: AN EXAMINATION OF AUSTRALIA'S 
REFUGEE AND HUMANITARIAN DETERMINATION PROCESSES, ch. 9 (2000). 
130 See text supra at note 75. 
131 See the case law discussed in NOWAK, supra note 61, at 467-75. 
132 As Goodwin-Gill notes, "'No duty to admit' begs many questions .... State practice in fact attributes little 
weight to the precise issue of admission, but far more to the necessity for non-refoulement through time, pending 
the obtaining of durable solutions." GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 56, at 123. 
133 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 46, Art. 12(2). 
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in the Refugee Convention, the principle of family unity was referred to in the Final Act of 
the United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless 
Persons, which drafted the Convention,134 and the UNHCR Executive Committee has adopt- 
ed several conclusions affirming its importance.135 Australia assumed legal obligations to re- 
spect the family under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Con- 
vention on the Rights of the Child, which may require the reunion of families separated in 
the course of a refugee's flight. 
Relevant provisions of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights are Articles 23 and 17 
concerning the right to marry and to found a family, and prohibiting arbitrary interference 
in family life, respectively. The Human Rights Committee has stated that Article 23 implies the 
possibility that couples will live together, which requires reunification of families "when their 
members are separated for political, economic or similar reasons."'36 Furthermore, the Com- 
mittee stated in its general comment on the position of aliens under the Covenant that al- 
though there is no right to enter a country other than the state of nationality, exceptions arise 
in cases involving considerations of family life.'37 Recently, the Committee decided that Aus- 
tralia would be in breach of Articles 17, 23, and 24 (protection of children) of the Covenant 
if it deported the stateless parents of a child born in, and a citizen of, Australia, both of whom 
had resided there (albeit unlawfully) for many years.'38 
Thejurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee is supported by developments before 
the European Court of Human Rights regarding Article 8 of the European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,139 and the Court could con- 
ceivably hold that family members of a refugee have a right to enter the state to which the per- 
son has fled if it is otherwise impossible to reestablish family life."40 Most recently, the summary 
conclusions of the fourth expert roundtable, which formed the "second track" of the "global 
consultations" held by UNHCR in the context of the fiftieth anniversary of the Refugee Con- 
vention, accepted that a right to family reunion may be recognized in such cases.'41 These 
conclusions constitute subsidiary evidence as to the state of international law.142 
The Convention on the Rights of the Child also contains various relevant provisions, in- 
cluding Article 16 (the equivalent of Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights); Article 3, which states the cardinal principle of the "best interests" of the 
child; Article 22 concerning refugee children; and Articles 9 and 10, which deal with the 
separation of children from parents. Article 22(2) requires states to assist refugee children 
134 Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons, Final Act, Recommendation 
B (July 28, 1951). 
135 UNHCR Executive Committee, Conclusions No. 88 (L), Protection of the Refugee's Family (1999); No. 85, 
supra note 58, paras. (u)-(x); No. 84 (XLVIII), Refugee Children and Adolescents (1997); No. 24 (XXXII), Family 
Reunification (1981); No. 9 (XXVIII), Family Reunion (1977); No. 1 (XXVI), Establishment of the Sub-Committee 
and General, para. (f) (1975). 
6 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 19, para. 5 (July 27, 1990), reprinted in COMPILATION OF 
GENERALCOMMENTSAND GENERALRECOMMENDATIONSADOPTED BYHUMAN RIGHTSTREATYBODIES, UN Doc. HRI/ 
GEN1/Rev.5, at 137, 138 (2001), available at <http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf>. 
137 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 15, para. 5 (Apr. 11, 1986), reprinted in id. at 127, 128, avail- 
able at <http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf>. 
138 Communication No. 930/2000, Hendrik Winata & So Lan Li v. Australia, UN Doc. CCPR/C/72/D/930/ 
2000 (2001), available at <http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf>. 
139 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 83, as 
amended by Protocol No. 11, May 11, 1994, 33 ILM 943 (1994). 140 SeeKateJastram & Kathleen Newland, Family Unity and Refugee Protection 28, background paper for discus- 
sion at the UNHCR global consultations (2001), at <http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home?page=events>; 
cf. Helene Lambert, The European Court of Human Rights and the Right of Refugees and Other Persons in Need of Protec- 
tion to Family Reunion, 11 INT'LJ. REFUGEE L. 427, 438 (1999). 
141 UNHCR and Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva, Geneva Expert Roundtable, Summary Con- 
clusions on Family Unity, para. 5 (Nov. 8-9,2001), at <http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home?page=events>. 
142 Many of the participants are eminent publicists within the meaning of Article 38(1) (d) of the Statute of the 
International Court ofJustice. Some members of the roundtables, however, participated as governmental repre- 
sentatives rather than independent experts. 
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in tracing their parents and gaining information necessary for family reunion. The view was 
expressed during the drafting process that states should not be obliged to guarantee the ad- 
mission of family members of child refugees and asylum seekers.'43 However, Article 22 sim- 
ply reinforces other obligations that may require reunion, including Articles 17 and 23 of the 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
Article 9(1) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child prohibits the separation of par- 
ents from their children unless it is in the best interests of the child. The travauxpriparatoires 
indicate that Article 9 was intended to apply to separations occurring in the domestic con- 
text, leaving separations involving different countries to be regulated by Article 10.144 How- 
ever, the two articles are expressly and closely linked. Article 10(1) provides that, "[i] n accor- 
dance with the obligation of States Parties under article 9, paragraph 1, applications by a 
child or his or herparents to enter or leave a State Party for the purpose of family reunification 
shall be dealt with by States Parties in a positive, humane and expeditious manner."'45 As noted 
during the drafting of Article 10, the obligation to deal with applications in a "positive" man- 
ner does not prejudge the outcome of the application.146 However, the new Australian visas 
preclude the possibility of an application altogether.147 
IV. CONCLUSION: WHITHER THE PACIFIC SOLUTION? 
The Pacific Solution is detrimental to refugee protection and likely to prove impractical 
in the longer term.'48 The Australian government has erected the main obstacles to change 
through its unwillingness to listen to international opinion'49 and its corresponding eagerness 
to manipulate Australian public opinion. Onshore asylum seekers are portrayed as "forum- 
shoppers" who throw their children overboard,'50 and terrorists.151 By playing into Austra- 
lians' long-standing fear of the Asian other,152 the government secured election for a third 
term. It now thinks it has a mandate for its policies. 
PENELOPE MATHEW* 
143 SHARON DETRICK, A COMMENTARY ONTHE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD 371 
(1999). 
144 Id. at 170. 
145 Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 48, Art. 10(1) (emphasis supplied). 
146 UN Doc. E/CN.4/L.1575, para. 74 (1981), cited in DETRICK, supra note 143, at 192 n.56. 
147 Australia has previously been criticized concerning family reunion for refugee children. Concluding Obser- 
vations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: Australia, UN Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.79, para. 30 (1997), 
available at <http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf>. 
148 Only Ireland has shown any interest in resettling the asylum seekers. Andrew Clennell, RefugeePlan May Back- 
fire, Says Ruddock, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Dec. 6,2001, available at <http://old.smh.com.au/news/0112/06/ 
national/national5.html>. 
149 This is evidenced by Australia's failure to amend its legislation in response to the Human Rights Committee's 
views in A v. Australia, supra note 48, and strong advocacy of the Pacific Solution by the minister for immigration, 
see, e.g., Ruddock, supra note 95. 
150 It was alleged in the lead-up to the recent federal election that some boat people had thrown children into 
the sea. Apparently, there was no evidence to support this statement and the Senate has established a "select com- 
mittee for an inquiry into a certain maritime incident." 
151 SeeAAP, BlastforReith on Terrorism, AGE, Sept. 15,2001, available at <http://www.theage.com.au/news/national/ 
2001/09/15/FFX1PUKMLRC.html>. 
152 SeeMARYCROCK, IMMIGRATION A D REFUGEE LAW INAUSTRALIA 11-15 (1998); DON McMASTER, ASYLUM SEEK- 
ERS: AUSTRALIA'S RESPONSE TO REFUGEES (2001). 
* Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Law, Australian National University. This article draws on an opinion written by 
the author at the request of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. I am grateful for the assistance 
of Marie-Charlotte McKenna and Andrei Seeto. 
676 [Vol. 96:661 
